Lessons to learn from Kargil

by Prof Jamaluddin Naqvi

THERE is not much of a tradition in Pakistan of using of events as case studies to improve our grasp of things and, through this, our future performance. Successes are glorified while reverses are just slipped under the rug.

No one knows whether the 1965 war was worth the risk, and whether itwas won or lost. The Hamoodur Rahman Commission report on the 1971 war and the breakaway of our eastern wing was never made public. Even a relatively simple matter as the assassination of Pakistan's first prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan is still shrouded in mystery.

Our going up the hill in Kargil was lauded as a daring exploit and our coming down as the height of wisdom. In this futile exercise hundredsof lives were lost. The personnel dying on both sides in the Kargil skirmishes were certainly fulfilling their patriotic duty, but thosewho inflicted this cruel fate on them are answerable to the people fortheir rash action.No doubt, Pakistan's initiative in Kargil was a brilliant tactical move. But being out of tune with the prevailing regional and international climate of opinion, it turned out to be self-defeating, indeed counter-productive. It was taken in a strategic vacuum and in a world environment militating against such a move. Trigger-happy rulers in the subcontinent seem to be suffering from the curse of Cain.

Some of the important realities the planners of the Kargil move and those who approved of it did not take into account were

a) Changing ground realities for strengthening one's argument at the bargaining table was standard practice during the cold-war period. It was practised by the Koreans and the Vietnamese up to the last moment prior to negotiations. But the use of force is no longer a tool of diplomacy in the post-cold war world.

b) No on can be fooled by passing on positional warfare as guerrilla insurgency. Guerrillas may achieve liberated areas, but they do so usually in sympathetic, densely populated areas, not atop desolate glacier-bound hills that can neither provide shelter nor resources. Verification is no problem in this satellite age. Let us take this opportunity to salute those brave martyrs who remain officially unsung and unhonoured.

c) We have lived up to the myth that having entered the nuclear club, we can behave like a mini-superpower.

Following the 1998 May Indian blasts, President Clinton had said that nuclearization no more adds to a country's security. It does not add to a country's bargaining power either. It is a credit to our rulers that instead of doing a bit of nuclear-rattling in Kargil, they came downthe controversial hilltops.

In his effort to defuse the Kargil crisis, Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz rushed to New Delhi on June 12. Probably hoping to prop up his clout,he completed a semi-circle and went to Delhi via Beijing. The Indians were not impressed, as the Chinese maintained a studied silence onPakistan's Kargil adventure. China is Pakistan's time-tested friend but it is nota protege that can be expected to go along with it in its racklessactions and escapades. It is a player on the global stage. It is striving to be integrated into the global economic system, is dismantling its nationalized sector, encouraging orderly privatization, and absorbing finance capital, so that it may carve a place for itself in theupcoming multi-polar world. With such high stakes propelling it towards global integration, how could it be expected to do some shadow-boxing for Pakistan? Pakistan has an executive in place, both civilian and mili-tary, but it lacks a think-tank that can monitor the changing world scenario andhelp the executive in readjusting its strategic format.

Since the end of the cold war Germany has been reunited, the European Community has emerged and intermediary economic centres have come up in East Asia. Russia, China and most of the East European countries are being absorbed into the global economy which has its centre in the US. With swift technological advances, especially in the field of information, globalization of the economy, and at its core, finance capital, is well underway. Finance capital led to monopolies and colonies (imperialism), then to transnationals, then to multinationals and is now congealed into one huge mass, leading to globalization. We have seen how one financier Soros could destabilize half a dozen South- East Asian economies.

After the Washington Declaration senior American offices lectured Pakistani pressmen that they (American officials) knew all about the UN resolutions, on Kashmir, the Taskent and Simla agreements and theLahore declaration, but President Clinton was not discussing the history ofthe Kashmir dispute with Mr Nawaz Sharif but only Pakistan's intrusion into Kargil. Had sober thinking informed decision-making in Pakistan, our rulers would have been spared the rude shock that, instead of the Kashmir issue being internationalized, the Kargil crisis turned out to be a political and diplomatic debacle for Pakistan. Pakistan's seemingly brilliant tactical move turned out to be located in a strategic vacuum. But the global consensus is not specifically anti-Pakistan; it is basically oriented towards defusing flash-points. It had a restraining effect on India also in a critical situation. The jingoists and Pakistan-haters in that country wanted New Delhi to escalate the conflict and 'teach Pakistan a lesson'. It was world opinion that kept India confined to its side of the Line of Control. Moreover, the Washington Declaration provided Pakistan a soft landing from the precarious Kargil heights. No reprisals, no punishments.

At home Nawaz Sharif government is being perceived as having failed in diplomacy vis-a-vis India, which was able to win international support on the Kargil issue. A victory has been there, but it is a victory for peace and not for India as such. Secondly, the refrain that unless the Kashmir dispute is settled there will be more Kargils crates misgivings and the fear that there may be new troubles ahead.

Dialogue with India should of course be held, but the impression that dialogue means India's handing over Kashmir to Pakistan is quite misplaced. Dialogue can lead to a settlement of simpler problems of difference, while tricky and sensitive issues may have to wait.Pakistan certainly has its principled stand on Kashmir but India has de facto control of the disputed territory, and the world is disinclined to risk the uncertainties of overturning a long established political reality however distasteful in principle.

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